search University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
The Forgotten Anarchist: Political and Legal Aspects of Alexei Borovoy’s Anarcho-Humanism
The article examines the political and legal ideas of Alexei Borovoy, a Russian anarchist thinker of the early 20th century and author of the anarcho-humanism theory, which represents an original anti-state doctrine and rethinks the established positions of classical anarchism. Borovoy was influenced by a broad variety of ideas, and the evolution of his views can be conceptualized with a Hegelian triad: the Marxist thesis, the individualist antithesis, and the blending of personalistic and existentialistic attitudes with syndicalist practice as the synthesis. He presents anarchism as a constant striving towards an individual’s self-liberation through the negation of social reality; and this striving shall be seen as a universal condition for the development of all mankind rather than some social utopia project. By revealing the irresolvable antinomy between individual and society, his philosophy predicates the anti-finalist spirit of anarcho-humanism. Determined by the aforementioned beliefs, Borovoy’s criticism of the state and other “social fetishes” still deeply rooted in the human mind is followed by an analysis of his critique of anarchism itself and the debate with Kropotkin and other libertarian theorists. Borovoy postulates that the state is historically necessary and describes the range of factors that have brought it about. The criticism of the state system as the quintessence of organized power leads Borovoy to a detailed deconstruction of parliamentarism, the only objective of which is to preserve the status quo that can be summed up in the following six points: (a) the class nature of parliaments and the fictitious power of popular will; (b) the tyranny of the masses; (c) parliament’s subordination to the government; (d) the opportunism of political parties; (e) the hypocrisy of election procedures; and (f) non-professionalism of parliamentarians. Borovoy defines the law as actual relations formed in the course of life and originating mainly in the human mind that should be regarded as part of the psychosocial current of legal thought. From his criticism of the law that is made ex parte by those in power and becomes necessarily coercive and precluding voluntary acceptance of social obligations, Borovoy turns to the law based on conventional norms established by common agreement and commonly supported and accepted. However, similarly to the “anarchist ideal”, his approach offers an unlimited freedom to exercise human abilities, but fails to suggest any reasoned, specific, and consistent principles to serve as a basis of this law, and sticks to general and abstract formulas.
The very specific, power-centric nature of the Russian state system has provoked various forms of reaction, from practical resistance (Pugachev’s rebellion, Stepan Razin’s uprising, the October Revolution, etc.) to deep reflections on freedom, self-government and anti-statism, which gave rise to the unique political theories of anarchism. Neither Russian Marxists, nor conservatives (not to mention liberals) were able to demonstrate the same level of originality and novelty, which transformed Russian anarchism into a global trend. “Anarchism has been largely invented by the Russians,”  summarized the prominent existentialist thinker Nikolai Berdyaev more than half a century ago.
Yet, even for the majority of the educated public the words “a Russian anarchist theorist” are likely to bring to mind two or three names at best: Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and, perhaps, Leo Tolstoy (though in his case the literary genius would clearly (albeit, rather unfairly) outshine his social influence). Certainly, the above anarchists are well known all around the world, not only in Russia. However, this list does need to be expanded, since the history of Russian thought includes some names which have long remained eclipsed by recognized classics despite their impressive theoretical contribution and civic courage. One such unfairly forgotten name is Alexei Borovoy (1875–1935), philosopher, professor, gifted musician, historian and literary critic. Having blended the national fundamentals with the European political tradition in his teachings, he managed to enrich Russian tradition of law and sociology. However, despite the existence of sizable archive materials related to Borovoy (the thinker’s personal archives in the Russian State Archive of Literature and Arts (RGALI) consist of more than 50,000 pages)  Russian researchers have never studied his creative legacy in sufficient detail. There are several reasons for this lack of attention. During the Soviet era, anarchism was mainly viewed as something that Bolsheviks had to struggle against. Accordingly, the unsuccessful (from a practical point of view) post-classical anarchist tradition to which Borovoy belonged failed to generate widespread interest in the academic community. The same fate befell Borovoy’s “anarcho-humanism”, which was closer to individualistic anarchism  that proved to be just as unsuccessful in the actual revolutionary struggle.
In modern Russia, the situation has been gradually changing, but a systematic overview of the thinker’s political and legal views is lacking still. The only study with a historical and legal analysis of Russian anarchism in the post-classical period  that examines, among others, the teachings of Alexei Borovoy, is the doctoral thesis by Sergei Udartsev (1992).  The paper presents the most complete classification of anarchist theories in Russia to date, including, in particular, a general overview of Borovoy’s political and legal views in the context of Russian anarchist teachings.
Besides Udartsev, significant contribution to the study of anarcho-humanism has also been made by Ryabov.  His publications are characterized by original interpretations of the fundamentals of Borovoy’s doctrine, as well as by a dedicated study of selected archive materials and episodic details of Borovoy’s personal and creative biography. These works provide a starting point for a more systematic and profound study of Borovoy’s views as they shed more light on his worldview and help to correctly place his philosophy within the anarchist system. Proceeding from the works of Udartsev and Ryabov, we can focus on analyzing the political and legal aspect that is most important for us, i.e., Borovoy’s views on the state, the law, and the related categories.
Certain aspects of Borovoy’s teachings or a brief overview of his legacy can be found in the works of Tsovma,  Talerov,  and Oleinikov.  Borovoy also figures in the works of Arefyev,  Krivenky,  Aladyshkin,  and Rublev  on the history, classification and evolution of Russian anarchism, which include, in addition to political doctrines of Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin that have become the mainstream of Soviet historiography, references to the works of foreign classics of anarchism and Russian anti-state theorists of the early 20th century.  The anarcho-humanist theory and Alexei Borovoy himself are still virtually unknown outside Russia. Relevant English publications are limited to several works  with episodic references to Borovoy’s biography and views. As for his theoretical legacy, the only work translated into English is Anarchism and Law, a single chapter from his opus magnum, Anarchism (1918). 
This article represents the first comprehensive study of anarcho-humanism to be published in English.
In the first paragraph we discuss the background that was instrumental in shaping the distinctive views and beliefs of Alexei Borovoy, the evolution of his philosophy and the main stages thereof, and the existing approaches to the classification of his ideas. The second chapter analyzes the fundamentals of the philosophical paradigm of anarcho-humanism, which explain the unique nature of his political and legal views. Finally, in the third chapter we present the political and legal concepts of Borovoy’s doctrine and analyze his views on the state, the law and the associated social institutions and categories. Based on the above, we identify the distinctive features of anarcho-humanism and determine its place in the context of main anarchist strains through comparison with the traditional forms of Russian and foreign anarchism.
1. Background of Borovoy’s anarchism
In this chapter, we follow the formation of Borovoy’s beliefs, discuss the intellectual origins of his teachings and try to conceptualize his political and legal views. To do so, it will be essential to determine the place of Borovoy in the anarchist system of coordinates in accordance with the current classification of Russian anarchism and find a correct name for his theory.
At present, there is no established opinion on the classification of Borovoy’s philosophy and his adherence to any specific strain of anarchism. In fact, the conceptualization of views expressed by an advocate of anti-rationalism and anti-scientism, who postulated the primacy of the individual and personal freedom while simultaneously using the class rhetoric and calling for the widespread application of syndicalist tactics, appears rather challenging.
Udartsev classified Borovoy’s philosophy as neoclassical anarchism of the post-classical period and defined it as a separate school of thought: anarcho-humanism.  The definition was upheld by Oleinikov in his works.  The above classification appears justified, considering that Chapter IX of Anarchism is also entitled: Anarchism as a Social Ideal (Anarcho-Humanism). Udartsev also introduced separate categories of individualist anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists and classified them as another (distinctive from Borovoy) branch of post-classical anarchism — neoclassical anarchism. As for Borovoy himself, in addition to numerous references to individualism that are discussed below, in one of his early books he referred to “revolutionary syndicalism” as a concept dear to him  and proposed it as an alternative to the bourgeois order. Moreover, his activity was always closely connected with anarcho-syndicalism: in 1918, he published the Zhizn (The Life)  newspaper together with a prominent anarcho-syndicalist Dmitry Novomirsky, was one of the leaders of the Moscow Union of Ideological Propaganda of Anarchism with a group of other anarcho-syndicalists and worked as editor-in-chief of the anarcho-syndicalist publishing house Golos Truda (The Voice of Labor). Considering the above, the classification of Borovoy’s philosophy into a separate school of thought and, generally, the segregation of a large number of different anarchist trends may appear debatable in view of the scarcity of anarchist theorists in the early 20th century.
The excessive branching of anarchism types tends to make any generalization unproductive; therefore, the attempt of some researchers to include Borovoy’s views into the larger schools of anarcho-syndicalism or individualist anarchism is easily understandable. Aladyshkin classified Borovoy as a representative of an individualist school in his thesis paper and argued that Borovoy made references to syndicalism mainly as a tactical move: “We must draw a clear line here: revolutionary syndicalism is mainly about tactics, it is a plan of action, while individualist anarchism is a philosophy in the broadest meaning of the word, it defines an individual’s beliefs, including general issues of our place and role in the world around us. Accordingly, Borovoy’s dalliance with syndicalism does not contradict his anarcho-individualistic beliefs, it simply provides answers to tactical challenges of revolutionary struggle.” 
This position is also shared by Krivenky.  However, it would be more appropriate to put apart Borovoy’s position on the majority of substantial issues  rather than to attempt to squeeze it within the strict confines of the traditional classification. For example, philosopher Ryabov, who tried to avoid putting a specific political tag on the thinker’s views and did not deny his closeness to the anarcho-individualistic tradition,  still segregated his philosophy from major schools of thought and believed that the most appropriate definition would be “romantic anarchism”: “The anarchism of Borovoy, as a philosopher who evolved in the mainstream of neo-romantic culture through the philosophy of life towards existentialism, should be most accurately called romantic anarchism. This definition is much more precise, integral and substantial than any other tag traditionally put on it, because his theory represents a synthesis of individualist anarchism with its apotheosis of an individual and anarcho-syndicalism with its libertarian and socialist program and the apology of a mass self-managing labor movement, whereby syndicalist ideas and methods are expanded and applied to the struggle of “working intelligentsia” for their rights.” 
Given the above methodological challenges combined with the application of the most popular temporal classification  of anarchist theories, the academic community generally agrees on placing Borovoy among representatives of post-classical anarchism. 
None of the researches question the originality of Borovoy’s philosophy, while some even speak of a new worldview paradigm.  On our part, we suggest considering Borovoy’s teachings as a separate school of thought and applying the self-designation of anarcho-humanism that was coined by Borovoy to describe his philosophy and subsequently taken up by Udartsev. His theory is too distinctive to fit any of the commonly identified large schools of thought. However, the term “humanism” should be essentially seen without any liberal connotations. Borovoy’s philosophy is really centered around the individual as an element of society, nation, and mankind. The development of individuality (not to be confused with individualism), creativity, conscience and culture in a broad sense, the rights and freedoms of every human being and their relations with other human beings on the basis thereof, as well as love and cooperativeness are significant elements of his theory. Borovoy was a lawyer; accordingly, he believed that the expansion of human rights and freedoms, “a creative liberation of personality” and the removal of any hindrances thereto were extremely important for the development of each individual. At the same time, Borovoy did not share the traditional associations of humanism with anthropocentrism, rationalism, and finalism. The formation of Borovoy as a thinker coincided with the end of the 19th century, the period of the most productive cross-influence of different philosophic traditions and political ideologies. In his student years, Borovoy became fascinated by Marxism: later, he himself spoke of it as a kind of “baptism” and noted that he had “a religious belief” in the theory of economic materialism,  although piousness had always been foreign to his active and skeptical mind. 
At that time, Borovoy began publishing articles, mainly on economics, in Moscow newspapers.  Later, political economy would be one of his most successful courses red in the Moscow University where he would remain to teach as one of its best graduates. But his personal biography was going to share the fate of Marxism in the history of post-revolutionary (after the events of 1848–1849) Europe. The skepticism promoted by philosophical teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was now focused on their own works, and the new generation of thinkers, such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Henry Bergson, prompted the society to question the principles of dialectic materialism and class socialism. The ideas of Nietzsche made Borovoy re-examine his Marxist beliefs but Nietzscheanism also failed to provide him with comprehensive answers. It was a very painful period for Borovoy, the only time in his life when he had to struggle with thoughts of suicide.
The young Privatdozent  managed to overcome his depression during a scientific business trip to Europe  in 1904, where his initial fascination with Marxism and Nietzscheanism was ousted by anarchism. “No one taught anarchism to me, didn’t persuade me, didn’t infect me,” he wrote in his memoirs much later.
“Suddenly, out of some unknown depths a great, well-formed, enlightening, united thought was born in me. With unusual clarity, with victorious cogency a feeling of an attitude that was new to me was born in me. […] I stood up from the bench in the Luxembourg Garden as an enlightened, passionate, uncompromising anarchist, and I still remain one.” 
Until then, his knowledge of anti-state theories had been limited to Anarchism, a recently published book by Paul Eltzbacher. In the years of the first Russian revolution, Borovoy returned to his homeland. He was involved in the publication of “Pereval”, a modernist magazine in Moscow and became the head of an anarchist publishing house, “Logos”. At that time, Borovoy highlighted the connection between his beliefs and the latest movements of European philosophical and political thought.
After his “revelation”,  Max Stirner,  an extreme German individualist, became the first thinker with the ideas that were in tune with Borovoy’s new aspirations. He saw the “explosive force” of Stirner in the “apotheosis of unrestricted Ego” and “the iron logic of ‘egoism’.”  The two Germans, Nietzsche and Stirner, strongly influenced the style of Borovoy’s writings: in his early theoretical works he often quoted  or made references to Nietzsche, while his esthetic views followed those of Stirner, from whom he adopted the notion of 'the Unique' (Der Einzige). 
The most important work of this period written by Borovoy after his conversion to anti-statism and later described by him as “significant for anarchist literature in general”  was The Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism (1906) — his first study of anarchism.  Theoretical constructs formulated in his book combine the general critical anarchist tradition (which opposes anarchism to dominant European movements and theories) with the extreme individualistic attitudes within the anti-state platform. According to Borovoy, “the philosophy of liberalism is the philosophy of privileged classes, while socialism is the philosophy of the suffering proletariat.” As for anarchism, it is “the philosophy of an awakened individual” with “the ultimate liberation of an individual” as its “core idea”.  The liberation can be achieved through a gradual elimination of any imposed rules and formal, senseless restrictions related to suprapersonal establishments and institutes: Borovoy criticized “the People” of Rousseau and the capitalist “freedom” of Constant, the objectivism of Comte and the Marxian class theory. In this, he came very close to nominalism in his negation of objectified communes and establishments.  According to Borovoy, the principal condition of personal liberation is the technological progress leading to integrative labor:
“The process of functional differentiation and the division of labor will give way to another, colossal process, the process of integration, the process of the new aggregation of functions. Every individual will be able to produce any requisite product, alone and by themselves. No one will need any assistants, any specialists working in different industries. Each individual will become an all-sufficient economic unit.” 
His anarcho-humanism refocused the legacy of industrial and progressive ideas of unexorcized Marxism on attaining an opposite goal — the maximum liberation of an individual from any social influence. For a “born individualist”,  the focus on the individual will always be a prius. Later, Borovoy moved away from extreme individualist positions,  and his techno-optimism was replaced with anti-scientist and existentialist views.  But at that stage, his connection with Nietzscheanism and the works of Stirner was obvious, and before long it was logically developed in Borovoy’s next landmark book, Revolutionary Worldview (1907), which defined his individualistic habitus [“collective truth is a lie”]  as a philosopher, but permanently alienated him from liberals. He wrote it as a eulogy of revolutionarism and the creative force of an individual, and throughout the book he denounced “peaceful reformers” and the so-called “real politics” along with external determinism represented by historical necessity and historical laws.  Borovoy’s philosophical paradigm was strongly influenced by the romantic pathos of above-mentioned Jean-Jacques Rousseau,  in whose works the revolt against civilization and the denial of many traditional liberal values was combined with an “intuitive”, natural understanding. Anti-parliamentary rhetoric clearly based on Rousseau’s arguments  had a special place in Borovoy’s teachings. It found expression in his third major book, Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism) (1907). Although Borovoy’s general attitude to the works of the French encyclopaedistremained critical,  he borrowed from Rousseau certain irrationalistphilosophical premises, further developed and enhanced in Russian and European literature, including Pushkin, Goethe, Dostoevsky  and early Russian symbolists. 
Speaking of the influence of his compatriots, Borovoy traced his anarchist genealogy mainly to Mikhail Bakunin,  “the sublime thinker and leader” whom he saw as “an absolute and indisputable lodestar”.  In addition to Bakunin’s rebellious esthetics, Borovoy adopted his dialectical structure, his glorification of life, his worship of the human being and the critique of scientism, and the romanticisation of the world of politics. “I am, perhaps, the last actual romantic of our time,”  Borovoy wrote later in his memoirs. The above assessment first appeared in Revolutionary Worldview and reached its climax in Anarchism (1918), Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview (1920) and The Bakunin Myth (1925), while his essay Bakunin (1926)  written for a collection of essays to commemorate the 100 th anniversary of the classic has been acclaimed by researchers as the best overview and interpretation of Bakunin’s legacy.  The last of the pillars on which Borovoy based his teachings was Bergsonism, his “greatest… philosophical interest” and “the fourth after dialectical materialism, Nietzscheanism and Bakunism”.  Its influence was felt in his work starting from 1910 s, when he had to flee from the autocratic justice  and settled once again in France. There, in Paris, the conceptual backbone of Borovoy’s philosophy took its final shape. Borovoy adopted the ideas of freedom and creativity of life, expanded irrationalistic and personalistic motives and combined them with the consistent struggle for the liberation of an individual.He relied on the past achievements of numerous and often conflicting ideologies and constructions, from liberalism to class structure and revolutionary syndicalism. As for the latter, being inspired by variations by Georges Sorel  and early Robert Michels  (as could already be seen in his 1907 book, Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism)), Borovoy saw an alternative to the rationalistic doctrinism of parliamentary institutes and party bureaucracy in the creative force combining the spontaneity of life with a gradual personal liberation  . Thereby, schematically, the evolution of Borovoy’s views and the theoretical basis of his philosophy could be presented as a kind of a Hegelian dialectical scheme: having started with a declaration of a Marxist “thesis”, Borovoy then moved to its negation in the form of German individualist philosophy and Bakunin’s destroying spirit, followed by the evolution to a synthesis blending the ideas of personalists, syndicalist practices and the works of Bergson.
The result was the concept of anarcho-humanism, called so by Borovoy himself in a chapter on the anarchist ideal in Anarchism (1918).
2. The philosophical basis of anarcho-humanism
The above synthesis was the origin of his specific philosophical paradigm, which provided a foundation to his political and legal concept and determined both the scope and the compositional structure of his political and legal views. Next, we discuss the mature views of Borovoy, which date mainly to the post-emigration period. However, despite all intellectual influences and metamorphoses, his worldview and, in particular, his philosophical principles were characterized by a certain consistency in his attitude towards individualism, dialectics, existentialism, etc.
From the proposition that the development of an individual’s own nature and the external social environment is indefinite and continuous,  Borovoy proceeds to the thought that will become the basis of his philosophical paradigm: an individual’s worldview is dynamic.  Anarchism as a pursuit of self-liberation through the negation of the reality is an intuitive property of all individuals; consequently, Borovoy sees it as a universal horizon of human development rather than a stand-alone social utopia project.
Therefore, for him the objective and mission of anarchist worldview are not limited to the return to nature or some miraculous transformation of human personality. On the contrary, Borovoy believes that “the historical progress is, at the same time, human progress”  and describes it as “the struggle of culture for culture”  , whereby anarchism appears as “the successor of all previous liberation pursuits of the mankind.”  “Life is a dialectic process, a consecutive succession of organically joint affirmations and negations. Any affirmation carries elements of its own destruction; and a negation is a prerequisite of affirmation,”  said Borovoy. Accordingly, he bases his critique of contemporary political and legal forms and institutes on the principle of negative dialectics: he views the state, the parliament and the constitution as historical phenomena similar to any other social constructs; i.e., as temporary and transitional, as well as containing a potential need of negation in order to affirm a new form of public management.
Borovoy believes that human history as an endless struggle of an individual to become a fully-fledged political subject and enjoy an ever-increasing freedom never stops even after significant successes. He uses the parliament as an example to demonstrate how the fruits of victory would “become fetishistically rigid” and degenerate into enslaving bonds.  His vision reminds us of Bernstein’s maxim expressed in his famous formula: the end is nothing, but the motion is everything,  where “nothing” is understood as a fundamental unattainability of the end rather than its insignificance. The politics can function only if focused on an end; therefore, the motion becomes everything, both the end and the means.
Borovoy uses the above progressist invariability of human development to emphasize humanistic pursuit of personal perfection and liberation of an individual from the external and artificial confines created by an individual’s will. In his beliefs, the image of the future is not pre-programmed, and the progress towards this future is non-linear. Consequently, his anarchist theory does not include a detailed program, because Borovoy sees it as inappropriate: “The development of “ultimate” ideals is antinomic to the spirit of anarchism.”  There is no limit for an individual’s ascension towards perfection; similarly, “there will never appear such a positive social order that would put an end to the continuous evolution of human societies,” concludes the theorist  in his hope for the spontaneous creativity of the political process and solutions prompted by life itself.
As opposed to state socialists, Borovoy insists that social evolution shall be only determined by its vector directed at personal liberation, instead of an ultimate program: thus, anarchism is a way but not the final point. This is the manifestation of the “Bergsonian” infinite process in a synthesis with Bakunin’s “destroying spirit”,  which is more important than any specific content, just as life is more important than any schemes.  The latter explains why Borovoy is hostile to rationalism seen as the “supremacy of abstraction”, a predetermined, “dead” outcome, a force blocking the diversity and unpredictability of human existence.  “An idea is always an abstraction and, consequently, a negation of real life. Science exists as a reflection of life, it has no life of its own; it records the conceptions, the notions of life, but not life itself […] The science thinks of life but does not conceive life,”  argues Borovoy, challenging the dogmatic pathos of the Enlightenment philosophy. The recognition of an insoluble antinomy between the individual and the society that dooms human beings to an eternalstrive for the balance of personal and collective interests provides an additional substantiation to Borovoy’s position as anti-finalist and serves as the prerequisite for a dynamic concept of anarchism. The above antinomy means that “an individual has to negate, one by one, all of the social forms selected and affirmed thereby while being unable to exist without society.”  “Fatally stripped of any choice, a man is naturally rooted in the society that has produced him and left an indelible imprint thereon,”  but as social relations do not define the whole of an individual, there remains that ultimate indivisible ‘“core’, which is an eternal rebel against the social.” 
Having balanced accusations against collectivism and possible justifications thereof, Borovoy concludes that anarchism (as interpreted by syndicalists) is capable of taking into account collective interests and offering a compromise solution to the above antinomy  . He logically proceeds with the following theses (Table 1.):
All known historical social forms has suppressed and restricted an individual
In practice, social aims are more primitive than personal ones.
The burden of social problems deprives an individual of the ability to fully concentrate on their personal life.
Collectivism restricts the search for truth since truth is measured by social approval.
Within a group, an individual tends to limit personal responsibility.
Society lacks true reality.
An individual simply cannot exist outside human society.
Relations with others are an inevitable product of a stubborn instinct of self-preservation.
An individual has more opportunities for self-realization in a broad social circle.
Social relations foster meaningful moral ideals.
Even human genius develops through relations with other people.
Borovoy believes that social evolution follows an upward spiral towards a vague ideal in the attempt to resolve the antinomy between an individual and the society and the resulting conflicts between freedom and responsibility, the law and morals, the mind and life, and so on. Should this evolution, i.e., the social progress and the alternation of political forms, stop, it will inevitably trigger a reaction: “The social process […] is the process of continuous personal liberation through the evolution of the society […] Anarchism builds its assertions on a new understanding of an individual based on the eternal and antagonistic motion thereof,”  concludes Borovoy. However, anarchism shall not be seen as some static ideal, the attainment of which could be perceived as an imaginary aim of human development, or as an incessant and meaningless “negation for the sake of negation”. No, anarchism is a guidance, a path towards personal liberation, a worldview.
Summing up the theses discussed above, there are three fundamental concepts underlying the philosophy developed by Borovoy: “anti-rationalism” (an apology of life), individualism (an apology of personal liberation and growth) and “dynamism” (an apology of motion).  The three pillars are interconnected, as a dynamic anarchist’s view of the world is centered around an individual who can be gradually liberated from “jailers and whipmasters” only through active and consistent self-determination.
3. The issues of state, law and authority in Borovoy’s theory
Upon initial examination, the general political principles of anarchism, as presented by Borovoy, appear rather expatiative and even apophetic, focused exclusively on negation. “While there are some irreconcilable differences between separate currents of anarchist thought, there is a certain minimum program,” notes Borovoy. “The series of principles include the negation of power, of coercive authority and, consequently, of any organization based on centralization and representation, […] the negation of the law and the state, […] the negation of political struggle, democracy and parliamentarism, […] the negation of capitalism.”  But beyond the minimum program, the negation turns to anarchism itself. Borovoy adopts a critical stance towards representatives of European and American individualist anarchism (from Stirner to Tucker), rethinks the “rebellious” theory of Bakunin, and subjects the teachings of Kropotkin to a skeptical analysis: “Even the works of the most distinguished representatives of the anarchist doctrine surprise us by the weakness of their theoretical argumentation […] These books are written in their hearts’ blood but they lack the relentless logic of the facts that can both touch and convince.”
We will have a closer look at the self-criticism of anarchism when we pass to the analysis of Borovoy’s views on specific social institutions. It should be noted that anarchist self-criticism was the main factor that led to the recognition of a separate, “post-classical” stage (first half of the 20th century) in the chronology of anarchism, being mainly a post-Kropotkin stage. World War I, steady growth of state invasion and other disturbing signs of an emerging new world order forced anarchist theorists, including Borovoy, to revise their modernist, positivist, and naively-progressist views. At the same time, despite the revolutionary pathos of anarcho-humanism, its negative dialectics focused more on negationthan on synthesis does not postulate the total “rejection” of other teachings and ideas. While denouncing the ideologies of liberalism and socialism as suffering from serious flaws, Borovoy is prepared to adapt the liberation themes of these two “social ideals” that “have emerged as a vital protest of an individual against various forms of oppression and coercion typical of previous social formations.”  The same applies to rationalism: according to Borovoy, initially, these schools of thought used to be seen as “emancipators” but with time they degraded into an instrument of oppression and the “enslavement” of the individual. Starting from this premise in the best Marxist tradition, Borovoy comments: “The kingdom of absolute personal economic independence — and, consecutively, total personal liberation — must be preceded by a socialist regime.”  Just as it would be impossible for the society to “leapfrog the liberalism and bourgeois forms of economy”, the subsequent movement towards anarchism would be impossible without the stage of socialist transformations since many of the said transformations will become the basic elements on which the society of the future will be founded. “Instead of opposing the imminent social regime, all staunch anarchists must look forward to it and facilitate its emergence before fighting against it in the ultimate struggle,”  wrote Borovoy. On the one hand, this reasoning reflects the vestiges of Borovoy’s Marxist beliefs characterized by a determinism that detracts from personal dignity; on the other hand, the dynamic nature of his philosophy and his acceptance of the logic of political progress represent a serious challenge to common interpretations of anarchism as a reductionist, regressive and purely destructive force.  Borovoy’s detailed “negative” ideological criticism can be found in his assessment of “the system of state” and institutional political forms that exist within that system and are engendered and guaranteed whereby. According to him, the state is the main enemy of an individual, a point of view quite typical of an anarchist: “The State is the coldest of all monsters (…) The State is always a one-sided, permanently aggressive organization of class interests.”  Following Nietzsche in his characterization of the state as “the coldest of all monsters”, Borovoy puts emphasis on the class nature and the aggressiveness of this social phenomenon.  At the same time, “the State, which is basically evil, automatically carries within itself the cure against the historical evil. The State is doomed to destruction, it must disappear, as its very existence generates the feelings of protest, nurtures rebels and prepares the revolution,”  wrote Borovoy. Following in the steps of Bakunin, he speaks of the state using the abolitionist (Aufhebung) rhetoric borrowed from Hegelianism.
But Borovoy goes on to expand the definition of “statehood” and engages in debates “in absentia” with Kropotkin on several of the latter’s positions. He argues that the state is the result of a variety of factors, including conquest, the development of social culture, and the self-identification of people who raise the society to a new level.
The historic concept of Kropotkin, his views on the origins of the state and his idealization of “any communes, even those standing at the lowest step”  are the main objects of Borovoy’s criticism. He rejects such an interpretation and points out that “in some of the pre-state forms we find the same ability to kill a free individual and free creativity as in the modern state”.
“And certainly, the reasons behind the emergence of the state described by Kropotkin as the eternal gravedigger of free society, are much deeper than those suggested by Kropotkin. The society of truly free individuals cannot produce slavery; a truly free commune would never develop into a slave state,”  concludes Borovoy. For him, Kropotkin’s almost mechanistic idolization of the masses, seen by the classic as the subject of history as opposed to individual, is associated with the risk of infringement on individuality that is justified by the logic of scientism: “An individual as an independent creative agent of history is openly erased […] before the force that can be called the true center of [Kropotkin’s] anarchist worldview, the dominant idea of his sociological thought – the creative role of the masses.” 
Borovoy also points out that, although necessary historically, the state quickly transforms itself into an institute of power, which strives to overcome and suppress any other forms of self-realization  . Similarly to pervious stages of human development, the state has some useful functions (“the State is as necessary, as the primeval brutality of men, their initial narrow-mindedness, as the long theological wondering of mankind”)  but it does not cease to exist when this utilitarian principle is realized.
Borovoy believes that at a certain point the state begins to reproduce power by psychological, rather than disciplinarian means. Initially power appears as a logical construction, while institutional and normative systems emerge at a later stage. To some extent, this underlying assumption behind Borovoy’s anarchism presages ideas developed later by Michel Foucault in his disciplinarian theory of power, as well as Erich Fromm’s views on social character types:
“The first notion of power is born from spontaneous, non-conscious hypostatization of abstractions, mental dispositions, and instinctively developed relations into self-sufficient, supra-individual substances — the realities that ultimately subject their own creators, dominate and govern their will. Surrounded by unfathomable fetishism, the man who owns absolutely everything in this “reality”, whose will has gradually created all attributes of this vibrant and permanently moving “reality” throughout the motley course of history, ultimately becomes the first victim thereof.” 
Anarcho-humanism is just as skeptical towards the “natural state” as towards the society in which social relations are governed by norms upheld by the institutes of state coercion. “The microbes of power are scattered across all historic stages of human society. The legends of a “golden age” […] were dispelled long ago,”  writes Borovoy, looking back to the origins of human psyche, a psyche which demonstrated willpower while still at an embryonic stage.
Borovoy believes that the anarchist struggle against the state as the quintessence of “organized power” represents the fight against the form of extreme fetishism typical of human society. The deconstruction of “social fetishes” is a theme with clear Stirnerian origins. This theme has determined the system of Borovoy’s views from practically the very beginning of his philosophical career. Besides the state, Borovoy sees “social fetishes” in legislation, religion, morals and so on; he sees danger in their claims of being peremptory, absolute and self-sufficient with respect to an individual despite being essentially the products thereof.  From these positions, Borovoy criticizes elements of the contemporary state, such as the intrinsically repressive judicial system and the closely related, biased idea of “justice”, both hiding behind the abstract “common good”, which is just another contemporary fetish.
“There is no vile tyranny, no heavy oppression that cannot be justified with the broad and flexible formula of “common good”. It has been taken up as a slogan by all kinds of regimes to cover exceptional means, emergency tribunals, courts-martial, administrative exiles and banishments,”
writes Borovoy. He argues that courts, the police, prisons and, a fortiori, censorship all limit personal and political freedoms, one by one, under the pretext of common benefit for society as a whole (although the said benefit is absolutely unattainable except on anarchist principles), while, in fact, they do it to maintain the political domination of the state. In this, Borovoy’s anarchist project is utterly humanistic (he explicitly condemns capital punishment: “if the idea of a court in general is repugnant to a developed human mind, then capital punishment is definitely beyond everything human”)  and consistent: he opposes any administration, even in the sphere of cultural and educational regulation, and argues that “the struggle against filth and tastelessness must be left to education instead of censorship.”
However, the strength of “our traditional empirical beliefs in the supernatural force of various forms of “power” (the law, legislation, State and so on)” makes it problematic to oppose this domination. Moreover, Borovoy believes that even “the knowledge of mysterious processes which constitute the essence of power cannot provide men with the weapons needed to overcome them psychologically”, because its might is founded on three aspects of social reality:
1) the involvement of an indefinite multitude of individual aspirations in the processes which drive the momentum of power;
2) the long-term continuity of these processes; and
3) their inestimable disciplinary importance. 
In his opinion, religion also actively promotes the preservation of the above system. In his work Reflections on Religion (1920), Borovoy argues that a religious worldview is not necessarily related to any specific confession; however, it always requires “the negation by individuals of their identity and an awareness of themselves only as a part of a common whole” and, consequently, it “dictates passiveness and empty rhetoric.”  According to Borovoy, the recognition of the artificial and, in this particular case, the “mind-made” nature of supra-individual institutions is indicative of the dynamic evolution of their forms. This dynamic development retains the potential to satisfy the libertarian needs of an individual. The only constant is the person, who independently determines the nature and types of personal relations on the basis of self-consciousness, technical and economic culture and a sense of justice. Everything else is purely auxiliary. The fundamental issue is the distinction between those social institutions which are truly necessary and those which form “a false need” in the language of the Frankfurt School  and under these false pretenses become perceived as necessary: “There are no eternal, natural, and logical categories of relations outside human nature. The development of human nature leads to a constant, ongoing revision, reassessment and shifting of these categories.”  Thus, the main purpose of the anarchist approach is the correction of collective consciousness  to facilitate the emergence of a dynamic legal order which would truly satisfy the demands of an increasingly emancipated individual.
Having recognized that the state is the first enemy of the individual, Borovoy logically proceeds to a critical analysis of the “supporting social structures” of this institution which have acquired a progressive status and “a liberating glory” in the public mind — fetishes that support the fetishism of the state itself. “What is this political struggle against the state?” asks the anarchist and then answers his question himself: “Narrowed down to its true dimensions, it is the struggle against democracy, i.e., against the parliamentarism and political parties. 
A qualification is in order: Borovoy does not deny the contribution of the parliamentary idea towards the formation of a free society and the expansion of individual rights. He believes that the concept of equality and the recognition that every human being is “an end in itself” go hand in hand with the successes of contemporary democracy.  However, “the time when the bourgeois class led the struggle for human rights is over,”  and “their banners and slogans have become outdated.”  Although liberalism, its political guide, had emerged “as a vibrant protest of an individual against various forms of the oppression and violence typical of preceding social forms”,  as soon as the bourgeoisie attained political domination, it ceased to see the parliament as a champion of public interests. The parliament was transformed into an instrument used exclusively to preserve the status quo.
Accordingly, the focus is on the issue of the parliamentary system, which Borovoy considered to be an institution that is limited to the rival ambitions of the few most active population groups instead of being a venue for the competition of national or public interests.  And the self-restriction of power through a parliamentary system is seen by him as a mere “shop sign” used to disguise the expansion of the coercive powers of constitutional governments to an extent that exceeds even the powers of absolute monarchies. 
His arguments against parliamentarism can be summed up in the following six points:
(a) the class nature of parliaments and the fictitious power of the people’s will The parliament represents the interests of certain groups and persons instead of public interests (fictitious power of popular will);
(b) the tyranny of the masses The principle of the majority underlying the parliamentary institution is no more just than any other forms of subordination;
(c) parliament’s subordination to the government The parliament casts off its revolutionary nature and blends with the executive power directly responsible for the operational management of the state, becoming a single state mechanism;
(d) the opportunism of political parties From a force accumulating revolutionary energy, the party turns into a bureaucratic body that neutralizes any transformational potential and produces “professional representatives” to increase the new ruling class (bureaucracy);
(e) the hypocrisy of election procedures The election procedure is unable to bring worthy men to power: only demagogues and super rich people have a chance to be elected  ;
(f) the non-professionalism of parliamentarians  Elected parliamentarians include people of all trades and professions that have no relation to lawmaking whatsoever, as if the drafting of laws were a hobby and did not require any special skills and competencies.
The relevance and clear-sightedness of this criticism of representative democracy from an anarchist perspective became particularly significant a few years later, when several European countries saw power being taken over by advocates of totalitarian ideology through purely parliamentarian processes. Borovoy sees the way towards a progressive eradication of the evils of parliamentarism in “the new forms of lawmaking”, such as “a constituent convent” and “direct vote”  .
Borovoy understands that such a transition would be impossible without a radical transformation of the whole system of social relations. He notes that the establishment of a new anarchist order does not necessarily mean that the preceding achievements gained through the political evolution of humanity should be destroyed. “Yes, it is on this soil — the tendency of the State to engulf the individual, to paralyze personal will and acts with sanctions, that the anarchist revolt is born,” states Borovoy and continues to elaborate: “We do not know a single human society, even before the birth of the state, that would not have a certain system of rules. Social life requires certain regulation, but the rules can differ.” 
Therefore, Borovoy’s anarchist project does not envisage the elimination of the law as a social phenomenon. Borovoy argues that an anarchist society cannot exist without law sui generis; however, it can revise the fundamental principles on which social norms are based. If we look at his perception of the law from the ontological perspective, Borovoy tends to a socio-psychological interpretation of legal consciousness: “Life is stronger than written law, […] the law is chiefly a social fact and […] the making of the law is not a legal process. It is a social process,”  and the essence of law “is in the minds of people rather than in legal paperwork.” 
From this perspective, Borovoy’s views can be placed among prominent researchers of the late 19th century and early 20th century, such as Korkunov, Petrazhitsky, Reisner, Yashchenko, Ehrlich and others  .
Borovoy is one of a handful of anarchists, or, perhaps, the only one to give so much consideration to the law, including an analysis of its functions and origin. This focus is most probably explained by his legal education. 
Borovoy defines the law as relations developed in real life and mainly originating in the human mind.
On this issue of the origin and structure of law (the roots of law), his views are especially closely associated with legal sociologists (the Sociological School of Jurisprudence), in particular with the doctrine of Eugen Ehrlich.
Ehrlich, like Borovoy,  urged lawyers to pay attention to the so-called “living law”, that is, what “the parties adhere to in life”. This law “must be sought not in the paragraphs (articles) of legislation, but in prenuptial agreements, sales, lease, credit and mortgage contracts, in wills.” 
Erlich’s definition of law as the internal order of any association not created by the legislator laid the foundation for legal pluralism. Communities, corporations and associations have their own law, which they themselves create. The norms, charters, regulations of various associations act as law, although they are not created by the state. 
But Borovoy interprets this kind of “legal pluralism” and “living law” even more radically than Erlich. Borovoy not only denies the state monopoly to create law, he postulates the exclusively non-state origin of law, as legislation is developed ex parte and has a compulsory nature that precludes the voluntary acceptance of social norms.
Threrefore Borovoy disproves the stereotypes prevalent in the academic community, namely, that anarchism, which negates the state and state law, has an equally negative position concerning the law in general. “I can categorically say that anarchism recognizes and will recognize the “law” – its own, anarchist, “law”.”  As can be seen, Borovoy makes a substantial distinction between the law formed mainly by the pressure of legislative acts enforced through state coercion, although not necessarily synonymous with it, and the desired (i.e. anarchist) law, in other words, the proper, genuine law, true to its name, that will be intrinsic to the anarchist order. The dividing line is drawn according to fundamental principles underlying these social regulators. He defines the anarchist law as “conventional norms based on voluntary agreement of individuals abiding by such codes.” 
“It will resemble neither in spirit nor in form the laws of contemporary bourgeois society or the “decrees” of a socialist dictatorship. This “law” will not be inspired by the idea of dissolving an individual in the collective, […] it will not pour down as a flow of blessings […]. It will come organically from the restlessness of the spirit, which feels in itself the force of creation, the thirst for the creative act to realize its desires in real forms accessible to men.” 
Borovoy points out the need for social (non-state) regulation by individuals who are free to make decisions without the pressure of coercive state machinery. He even makes references to the idea of Rudolf Stammler, a German jurist and a “conscientious critic” of anarchism, who believes that there is no natural harmony without legal regulation. However, it is people themselves who make the rules, because “any agreement between people already contains a certain modification and a certain regulation of the natural life of every single human being.”  If such regulation is based on conventions between people, then the law exists within the framework of said conventions and, according to Borovoy, “none of the foremost representatives of anarchist thought negates the law since neither social organization nor its technological progress would be possible without certain regulation of social relations.” 
Borovoy believes that this “anarchist law” consists of “the responsibility for both individual freedom and the freedom of others”. This suggests that it will be “unable to ensure “unlimited” freedom to everyone.  Following his debate in absentia with absolute individualists, Borovoy continues:
“Anarchism, which is not an imaginary dream, but a reality offering an effective and realistic solution to the revolt of the human spirit against violence, does not have to speak of fictions such as “absolute” freedom “unlimited” by anyone and anything, the negation of duty, a total lack of responsibility, and so on.”  The premise of limited freedom leads to the conclusion that even such desired law will be imperfect. Instead of indulging in dreams of “a super-just heaven on earth”  that would exclude “any need for measures of coercion and, generally, of psychological pressure, as well as very possibility of the existence of such law”, Borovoy is nevertheless prepared to defend the proposed regulation of social relations: “Like any law, it will have to be defended. The concrete forms of this defense cannot be determined in advance. They will correspond to the specific needs of the anarchist society.”  In other words, they will inevitably include some means to enforce compliance with the rules established by the social contract. This fails to resolve the fundamental issue of individual freedom and its limits  , the issue that is raised by Borovoy in his work Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism:
“A society of truly free individuals can and must only be founded on the idea of a free contract. But if a contract is accepted, a man becomes enslaved by it; nothing can release him from the performance of his sacred obligation freely assumed. A breach of contract will be punished cruelly.” 
Here, a reasonable question follows: “Can we speak of personal freedom in a social order where this freedom is sacrificed whenever a contract, albeit the most sacred one, is violated?”  His conclusion confirms the above antinomy: social life in its current form is the very antithesis of the anarchist ideal since any social order is an external order that requires “instances of coercion”. Being aware that any attempts to resolve the above contradiction would be futile, Borovoy can only propose the direction towards potential solutions: “We need to look for a form of social coexistence that would admit the possibility of human relations but negate the very thought of any external order or regulation.” 
It would be impossible to fit the philosophy of Alexei Borovoy, a born individualist  , within the classical anarchist framework. His work is mostly distinctive and individual, characterized by an original interpretation of a large variety of anarchist premises. Borovoy was influenced by a broad variety of doctrines, which stimulated the development of a unique philosophical paradigm founded on the concept of an individual as the owner of a dynamic worldview. In his system, anarchism is presented as the striving towards self-liberation of an individual through the negation of the reality, and this striving, being an intuitive property of human personality, shall be seen as a universal condition for the development of all mankind rather than some social utopia project. Another distinctive feature of anarcho-humanist philosophy is the recognition by Borovoy of the insoluble contradiction between an individual and society, an antinomy that inevitably leads to the negation of any ultimate social ideal and to the eternal quest for a balance between the individual and the collective.
One of the central places in Borovoy’s concept is given to the self-criticism of anarchism; i.e., to theoretical debates with prominent classics on a number of key issues of social thought, including the philosophical basis of anarchism, the origin of the state, historiosophic beliefs, representative democracy, the feasibility of the proposed programs, and so on. Borovoy adopts a critical stance towards representatives of Western individualist anarchism, rethinks the “rebellious” theory of Bakunin, and subjects the teachings of Kropotkin to a skeptical analysis. The “self-criticism” in Borovoy’s works is triggered by the propensity of anarchist thinkers for outdated philosophic categories and rhetoric, which has not been properly eradicated from his point of view.
The above beliefs determine Borovoy’s approach to the phenomenon of the state, its nature and functions. Notwithstanding predictable criticism, Borovoy postulates that the state is historically necessary and describes the range of factors that have brought it about. The problem of the state is that it quickly transforms itself into a monopolistic institute of power, which strives to overcome and suppress any other forms of self-realization. Borovoy presents the struggle against the state, as the quintessence of organized power, as a specific case of struggle against “social fetishes” with their pretence to an absolute and intrinsically valuable nature. He makes no attempt to define specific forms of a future society. On the one hand, his approach offers an unlimited freedom to exercise human abilities and highlights the endless potential for human development, but on the other hand, it fails to answer the fundamental question of which principles will drive this development, and sticks to general and abstract formulas. As a result, it is virtually impossible to assess the relevance (i.e., conformity to anarchist ideals) of the ongoing changes in the society. Another problem closely linked to anti-finalism is the incremental nature of social liberation. If, according to Borovoy, the state is necessary at a certain stage, then we face the issue of assessing the limits of said necessity and deriving laws or rules that could be used to determine whether any social institution has outlived itself. Of particular note is the critique of parliamentarism proposed by Borovoy and relevant to this day.  Just as 100 years ago, democratic representation is still characterized by significant contradictions between the declared purposes of the political order and the mechanism of their attainment. The class nature of the parliament, the enormous controversies in the society, suppressed (but not eliminated) by the hundredths of percent of votes that make the “majority”, the selective approach to the nomination of candidates, and party opportunism are all indicative of the growing chasm between the declared “people’s sovereignty” and its practical implementation. From his criticism of the law that is made ex parte by those in power and becomes necessarily coercive and precluding voluntary acceptance of social obligations, Borovoy turns to the law based on conventional norms established by common agreement and commonly supported and accepted. He believes that this is the type of law that will be characteristic of the anarchist society. If we classify Borovoy’s theory in accordance with the criteria commonly applied to legal concepts, we can say that his “anarcho-humanism” is close to the psychosocial concept represented by Korkunov, Petrazhitsky, Reisner, Yashchenko and simultaneously to the emerging programme of legal pluralism. Borovoy defines the law as actual relations formed in the course of life and originating mainly in the human mind. However, similarly to the “anarchist ideal”, Borovoy once again fails to suggest any reasoned, specific and consistent principles to serve as a basis of this law. He speaks of voluntary contract as the fundamental condition for the functioning of the law, but does not address the issues vital for the philosophy of law, such as the limits of contractual freedom, the possibility of external interference, the use of coercion to enforce the agreement, and the problems of territoriality and conflict resolution in overlapping jurisdictions.
Still, any problems of Borovoy’s theory are the natural projection of its philosophical core – the idea that both individual conscience and social structures originating from human practice are dynamic in principle. In his criticism of classical anarchism Borovoy never thought that his theory was complete and free from internal contradictions. His views might appear too eclectic and even inconsistent but, quoting Jean-Jacques Rousseau who had a strong influence on Borovoy: “I would rather be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices.” 
 [All references are from the sources in Russian, unless indicated otherwise]. FURSOV, A. I., PIVOVAROV, Yu. S., The Russian System: Genesis, Structure, and Functioning: (Theses and Working Hypotheses). In: The Russian Historical Journal, 1998, V. 1, № 3.; PIVOVAROV, Yu.S., FURSOV, A.I., The Russian System and Reforms. In: Pro et Contra, vol. 4, 1999, № 4.
 RYABOV, P. V., Philosophy of Postclassical Russian Anarchism – Terra Incognita. In: Prepodavatel XXI Vek, 2009, Nr. 3, p. 290.
 BERDYAEV, N., The Russian Idea. St. Petersburg, 2008, p. 182. All translations from Russian are mine (author’s), unless indicated otherwise
 Many of his contemporaries characterized Borovoy as an outstanding man in their memoirs: his brilliant mind and integrity won him the recognition of the legendary Emma Goldman. GOLDMAN, E., Living My Life, vol. 2, NYC, 1931, p. 927, [in English]. Even Nestor Makhno, who was generally quite skeptical about “urban anarchist intellectuals”, admired his gift of oratory. MAKHNO, N. I., Memoirs. Book II. Under the Blows of the Counterrevolution. Paris, 1936, p. 58, [in English].
 In his young years, Borovoy even wanted to become a professional musician, but his interest in social activity put an end to those plans. (For details see Music in Borovoy’s Worldview, Pryamukhino Readings. 2010, Мoscow, 2012, pp. 40-64). “Alas! The man I was in those days thought too lightly of the pursuit that could have been my true vocation, the field in which I could truly find and fulfill myself.”RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 164. “University”. Sheet 107.
 Id. The Anarchist Philosophy of Alexei Borovoy (From the History of Russian Bergsonism). In: Bulletin of the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, 2010, Nr. 6, p. 23.
 Only a fraction of which (~15%) has been published to date.
 See, for example: ARVICH, P., The Russian Anarchists. Chico, p. 56, [in English]; ALADYSHKIN, I. V., The Individualist Anarchism Among Russian Intellectuals in the Second Half of the 19th Century – First Decade of 20th Century (based on Moscow and St. Petersburg materials). Dissertation for a degree in history. Ivanovo, 2006, p. 95.
 Post-classic anarchism or anarchism of the post-classic period is the classification commonly applied to theories and doctrines, which have been emerging since the beginning of the 20th century and focused on re-thinking the core principles of the anarchist theory developed by classic anarchist thinkers (mainly, Kropotkin) in the period between the French Revolution and the October Revolution (See: RYABOV, P. V., Philosophy of Postclassical Russian Anarchism — Terra Incognita. In: Prepodavatel’ XXI Vek, 2009, Nr. 3; UDARTSEV, S. F., Political and Legal Theory of Anarchism in Russia: History and Present. A doctorate thesis for a degree in law. Moscow, 1992.).
 Id. Political and Legal Theory of Anarchism in Russia: History and the Present State. A doctorate thesis for a degree in law. Moscow, 1992.
 RYABOV, P. V., The philosophy of classical anarchism (problem of personality). Moscow, 2007. Id. Philosophy of Postclassical Russian Anarchism — Terra Incognita. In: Prepodavatel’ XXI Vek, 2009, Nr. 3, pp. 289–297; RUBLEV, D. I., RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy: The Man, the Thinker, the Anarchist. In: Russia and the Modern World, 2011, Nr. 2. Id. Mikhail Bakunin and Alexei Borovoy: Consonance and resonance. In: Pryamukhino Readings, 2007, Tver`, 2008. Id. ‘My Past and Thoughts’ of Alexei Borovoy. In: Chelovek, 2010, Nr. 3.Id. Aleksei Alekseevich Borovoy and his book “Anarchism”. In: A. A. Borovoy Anarchism, Moscow, 2009. Id. Well forgotten old. Overview of archival Fund of the A. A. Borovoy RGALI. In: Culturalstudies: the Digest, 2009, Nr. 1 (48). Id. The Anarchist Philosophy of Alexei Borovoy (From the History of Russian Bergsonism). In: Bulletin of the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, 2010, Nr. 6.Id. Alexei Borovoy and the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (From the History of Russian Nietzscheism in the Early 20th Century). In: Prepodavatel’ XXI vek, 2010, Nr. 2, ch. 2. Id. The Russian Kantianism and neo-Kantianism of the Early 20th Century in Unpublished Memoirs of Alexei Borovoy. In: The Kantian Collection, 2010, Nr. 4. Id. The Romantic Anarchism of Alexei Borovoy (from the History of Russian Philosophy of Life). In: History and Philosophy Yearbook 2011, Moscow, IF RAN Publ., 2012, Nr. 1. Id. Alexei Borovoy and Alexander Herzen. Pryamukhino Readings 2012. Moscow, 2013, pp. 170–191.
 TCOVMA, М. А., Alexei Borovoy and Peter Kropotkin. In: Writings of International scientific conference devoted to the 150 anniversary from the birthday of P. A. Kropotkin. Nr. 3. P. A. Kropotkin and the revolutionary movement. Moscow, 2001.
 TALEROV, P. I., About the life and work of anarchist — humanist Alexei Borovoy. In: Bulletin of Moscow University, Ser. 12, Political science, 2008, Nr. 3.
 OLEYNIKOV, D. I., The Anarcho-Humanism of A. Borovoy. In: Obshchina, 1990, Nr. 47, pp. 4–6.
 AREF`EV, M.A., The philosophy of anarchism: Essays on the history. Saint Petersburg, 1992.
 KRIVEN`KII`, V., Borovoy Alexei Alekseevich. In: Political parties in Russia. The end of XIX – first third XX century, Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1996.
 ALADYSHKIN, I. V., The Individualist Anarchism Among Russian Intellectuals in the Second Half of the 19th Century – First Decade of 20th Century (based on Moscow and St. Petersburg materials). Dissertation for a degree in history. Ivanovo, 2006.
 RUBLYOV, D. I., The issue of “intelligentsia and revolution” in anarchist journalism of the early twentieth century. In: Russian history, Nr. 3, 2006. Id. The Moscow anarchists in the middle of the 1920-1930 s (Political struggle in conditions of repression). In: Pryamukhino Readings 2008,Tver`, 2010.
 RYABOV, P. V., The Problem of Individual in the Classical Anarchist Philosophy: dissertation for a degree in philosophy. Мoscow, 1996. [online source]. disserCat – electronic dissertation library. URL: http://www.dissercat.com/content/problema-lichnosti-v-filosofii-klassicheskogo-anarkhizma (query date: 15. 05. 2019).
 ARVICH, P., The Russian Anarchists. Chico, 2006, [in English]; GOODWIN, J., Confronting Dostoevsky’s Demons: Anarchism and the Specter of Bakunin in Twentieth-century Russia by Peter Lang, 2010, [in English]; DUBROVNIK, А.,Alexei Borovoy (from individualism to the Platform). In: KSL: Bulletin of the Kate Sharpley Library, Nr. 55-56, October 2008 [Double issue]; GURYANOVA, N., The Aesthetics of Anarchy: Art and Ideology in the Early Russian Avant-Garde First Edition. Oakland, 2012; AMSTER, R., Anarchism Today. Praeger, 2012, [in English];Id. Breaking the Law: Anti-Authoritarian Visions of Crime and Justice. In: The New Formulation, pp. 12-17, [in English].
 BOROVOY, A. А., Anarchism & law. Buffalo: Friends of Malatesta, CA. early-1970s. 8vo, Wraps, 7 p.
 UDARTSEV, S. F., Political and Legal Theory of Anarchism in Russia: History and Present. A doctorate thesis for a degree in law, Moscow, 1992. p. 164.
 OLEYNIKOV, D. I., The Anarcho-Humanism of A. Borovoy. In: Obshchina, 1991, Nr. 49, p. 3.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917, p. 3.
 RUBLEV, D. I., RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy: The Man, the Thinker, the Anarchist. In: Russia and the Modern World, 2011, Nr. 2. p. 225.
 ALADYSHKIN, I. V., The Individualist Anarchism Among Russian Intellectuals in the Second Half of the 19th Century – First Decade of 20th Century (based on Moscow and St. Petersburg materials). Dissertationfor a degree in history. Ivanovo, 2006, p. 95.
 KRIVEN`KII`, V. V., Anarchists. In: Political parties in Russia. The end of XIX — first third XX century. Moscow, 1996, p. 218.
 Core philosophical principles, his views on the individual, the state and the law, etc.
 RYABOV, P. V., The Problem of Individual in the Classical Anarchist Philosophy: dissertation for a degree in philosophy. Мoscow, 1996. [online source]. disserCat – electronic dissertation library. URL: http://www.dissercat.com/content/problema-lichnosti-v-filosofii-klassicheskogo-anarkhizma (query date: 15. 05. 2019).
 Id. The Romantic Anarchism of Alexei Borovoy (from the History of Russian Philosophy of Life). In: History and Philosophy Yearbook, 2011, Moscow, 2012, Nr. 1, p. 422.
 The most detailed classification is presented by Udartsev. It is based on the evolutionary principle: different currents within the anarchist movement are structured chronologically by their specific features and divided into two major phases: classic and post-classic. See: UDARTSEV, S. F., Political and legal theory of anarchism in Russia: history and modernity. A thesis for a degree in law. Moscow, 1992, p. 166.
 RUBLEV, D. I., RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy: The Man, the Thinker, the Anarchist. In: Russia and the Modern World, 2011, Nr. 2. p. 235.Id. Political and Legal Theory of Anarchism in Russia: History and Present. A doctorate thesis for a degree in law. Moscow, 1992, p. 275.
 BOROVOY, A. A., My Life. Memoirs. In: Chelovek, 2010, Nr. 3, p. 141.
 Borovoy himself wrote that he had been brought up in an atheist family (RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1.Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 13). He actually declared war on religious outlook and described it as “the acceptance of ultimate pessimism”, irrespective of whether “pessimism is a free and organic product of our life or a purely external effect of fear.” He believed it to be incompatible with anarchist worldview, which is “non-religious in itself.” In practice, however, his relationship with religion was much more complex than just a one-dimensional militant atheism. The mystical, the musical, and the irrational – all of these feelings so similar to the religious feeling were close to his view of the world. RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 138. “Arguments about religion”. Sheet. 2. In: Id. Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917, p. 156.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Units 2–4.
 He was Privatdozent of the Moscow State University since 1902, Professor in 1919–1922.
 In 1903–1905, Borovoy lived in Western Europe and worked on his doctorate thesis, The History of Individual Freedom in France. However, he was subsequently forbidden to defend his thesis, because the representatives of the Constitutional Democratic Party found it extremely radical.
 BOROVOY, A. A, My Life. Memoirs. In: Chelovek, 2010, Nr. 3, p. 137.
 It was prepared by Rousseau and Nietzsche, according to Borovoy. RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet. 38.
 “On that happy day I fished out a forgotten Eltzbacher from a pile of books. Next day, I asked for Godwin and Stirner in the Bibliothèque Nationale and sat down to study anarchism.” In: RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 38.
 BOROVOY, A. A, My Life. Memoirs; RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 168. Sheet 96.
 See, for example: Id. Revolutionary Worldview. Moscow, 1907, p. 5, 13 andId. Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism. Moscow, 1917, p. 17.
 Id. Revolutionary Worldview. Moscow, 1907, p. 9.; RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 39.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 38.
 Initially written as a lecture, it became the first overt declaration of anarchism in Russia. The lecture was given in the Moscow History Museum on 5 April 1906.
 BOROVOY, A. A, Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism. Moscow, 1906, p. 45.
 See: Id. Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism. Moscow, 1906.
 Id. Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism, p. 54.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 12. Borovoy recognizes that his infatuation with Lassalle in his early student days and the acquaintance with Leibniz’s theory of “the harmonious movement of independent, ever active monads” were both instrumental in “strengthening his individualism.” RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheets 13–14.
 “I only gave up individualist anarchism in late 1907, under the influence of practical anarcho-syndicalism in France.” In: RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 38.
 Later, when Borovoy was working on his own original doctrine and moving away from rigid individualist constructions, he wrote: “Stirnerianism is a fruitless wandering in the wilds of an empty ego, while Nietzscheanism is a doleful cry of heroic pessimism.” In: Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, pp. 17-18.
 BOROVOY, A.A., Revolutionary Worldview. Moscow, 1907, p. 12.
 Ibid. p. 46.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 22.
 See, for example: Id. Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917. Borovoy negates the exercise of power via representatives. In this he follows Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who advocated direct democracy and believed that only the people should exercise sovereignty (i.e., the power to make the laws): “Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void — is, in fact, not a law. The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose them. The idea of representation is modern; it comes to us from feudal government, from that iniquitous and absurd system which degrades humanity and dishonors the name of man.” (ROUSSEAU, J.-J., On the Social Contract. Translation from French by G.D.H. Cole. New York, 2003, p. 65).
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 22.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 164. “University”. Sheets 94-95. F.M. Dostoevsky had a special place among writers who influenced Borovoy’s beliefs. At the end of his creative career, Borovoy wrote a book on Dostoevsky that remained unpublished. The manuscript book is preserved in RGALI archives (Fund 1023, Inventory 1, Unit 113). “An outstanding mind and one of my favorite thinkers” — the high recognition of Dostoevsky by an anarchist required a certain amount of civil courage as Dostoevsky was out of favor with orthodox anarchists. Moreover, the Soviet Union waged a widespread war against “dostoevschina” (Dostoyevskian philosophy) seen as a reactionary outlook (See: RUBLEV, D. I., RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy: The Man, the Thinker, the Anarchist. In: Russia and the Modern World, 2011, Nr. 2, p. 231). Borovoy also argued that the works of Dostoevsky reflected the ideas of Stirner (See: BOROVOY, A. A., OTVERZHENNY, N., The Bakunin Myth. Мoscow, 1925, pp. 139–140).
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 164. “University’. Sheet 107.
 BOROVOY, A. A, My Life. Memoirs. In: Chelovek, 2010, Nr. 3, p. 152.
 RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy and Alexander Herzen. Pryamukhino Readings 2012. Moscow, 2012, p. 178.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 173. Sheet 100.
 BOROVOY, A. A., To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926.
 Id. The Problem of Individual in the Classical Anarchist Philosophy: dissertation for a degree in philosophy. Moscow, 1996. [online source]. disserCat – electronic dissertation library. URL: http://www.dissercat.com/content/problema-lichnosti-v-filosofii-klassicheskogo-anarkhizma (query date: 15. 05. 2019).
 Id. The Anarchist Philosophy of Alexei Borovoy (From the History of Russian Bergsonism), p. 1.
 “Soon the administration decided to restrict my lecturing. <…>I was arrested twice and banned from reading lectures at open courses and from teaching at commercial colleges. In 1911, I resigned from the University, not from solidarity with liberal professors but in protest against police intrusion. At the same time, I was charged by court for political pamphlets and the ideological leadership of the Logos Publishing House. The pending threat of imprisonment made me emigrate from Russia and settle in Paris.” In: RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 838. Sheet. 9. (RUBLEV, D. I., RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy: The Man, the Thinker, the Anarchist. In: Russia and the Modern World, 2011, Nr. 2, p. 224).
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became Anarchist” Sheet 34.
 Borovoy knew Michels personally and corresponded with him. See: RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 519.; Id. Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917.
 These ideas will be further developed in the following works: The Imaginary Crisis of Syndicalism (1912), Peace: Declaration of the Moscow Union of Ideological Propaganda of Anarchism (1918), The Problem of Individual in Kropotkin’s Doctrine (1922), Power (1935).
 BOROVOY, A. A., Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 154.
 Id. Revolutionary Worldview. Moscow, 1907, p. 54.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 65.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 169.
 Id. To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926, p. 133.
 Id. Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917, p. 32.
 BERNSTEIN, E., Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie. Hamburg, 1984, p. 201, [auf Deutsch].
 BOROVOY, A. A, Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 41.
 BOROVOY, A.A., To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926, p. 137.
 The influence of Bakunin is obvious. “I strongly believe that the idea that no ultimate anarchist ideal is possible, the idea of “permanent revolution” should be the only natural conclusion from Bakunin’s general philosophical theory,” wrote Borovoy. For him, the main idea behind the historiosophy of the prominent revolutionary was the consistent negation of animality and the affirmation of humanity in the individual. In: Id. To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926, p. 137.
 Id. Power. Anarchy and Power. Moscow, 1922, p. 164.
 Id. The mind and its contemporary critics. (The issue of new man). In: Nov, 1914, Nr. 6–9, 21–24 January, pp. 2–3.; Id. The mind and its contemporary critics. (The issue of new man). In: Nov, 1914, Nr. 7, 22 January, p. 3. Quoted from: RUBLEV, D. I., RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy: The Man, the Thinker, the Anarchist. In: Russia and the Modern World, 2011, Nr. 2. pp. 221-229.
 Id. To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926, p. 145.
 Id. Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 23.
 Id. To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926, p. 150.
 Id. Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 24.
 However, Borovoy does not limit his criticism to “collective psyche” and collective truth that inevitably leads to an artificial enslavement of the individual. In the above theses, we find the critique of the dominant socialist and liberal ideologies: although both socialism and liberalism proclaim the primacy of the human person, in practice they create such forms of the political process and such political institutions that are inevitably brought into conflict with an individual by their statist nature.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 65.
 RYABOV, P. V., The Problem of Individual in the Classical Anarchist Philosophy: dissertation for a degree in philosophy. Мoscow, 1996. [online source]. disserCat – electronic dissertation library. URL: http://www.dissercat.com/content/problema-lichnosti-v-filosofii-klassicheskogo-anarkhizma (query date: 15. 05. 2019). Ryabov suggest replacing “dynamism” with “activism”, but we believe that the first term is more relevant in the context of Borovoy’s philosophy. In addition to activism, dynamism also includes other important notions, such as dialectics and processuality typical of his philosophic beliefs.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 19.
 Id. Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 59.
 Id. Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism. Moscow, 1906, p. 81.
 Ibid. p. 88.
 See, for example: MAMUT, L. S., Statism and Anarchism as Types of Political Beliefs. The Pre-Marksist Period. Moscow, 1989, p. 192.
 BOROVOY, A. A., My Life. Memoirs. In: Chelovek, 2010, Nr. 3, p. 148.
 Ibid. p. 160.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, pp. 66-67.
 Ibid. p. 65.
 Id. The Problems of Individual in Kropotkin’s Doctrine. Petr Kropotkin. Collection of Articles. Eds A. Borovoy, N. Lebedev. Petrograd, Moscow, 1922, p. 33.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, pp. 136–137.
 Id. To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles, p. 160.
 Id. Power. Anarchy and Power. Moscow, 1992, p. 154.
 Id. To Michael Bakunin (1876–1926): An Outline of the History of Anarchist Movement in Russia: Collection of Articles. Moscow, 1926, p. 152.
 However, this does not apply to social regulators as such, since Borovoy suggests a completely different basis (other than the state) for them.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 87. “The vicious circle”. Sheet 2. (7 June — 5 July 1918).
 BOROVOY, A. A., Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 163.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 138 “Arguments about religion”. 1920. Sheet 9.
 See: MARKUZE, H., One-dimensional man: studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society. Boston, 1964.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Power. Anarchy and Power. Moscow, 1992, p. 162.
 Id. Revolutionary Worldview. Moscow, 1907, p. 25.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 82.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 79. Sheet 19.
 He means the fight against the rule of the nobility and clergy that were perceived as the concentration of all the defects of society and, quoting Marx, as “the class of manifest subjugation” and the condition for “the positive-general significance” of the bourgeoisie, which was confronting the former. MARX, K., ENGELS, F., Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction. Collected Works: 50 volumes, Moscow, 1955, vol. 1, p. 426, [in English].
 BOROVOY, A.A., Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917, p. 15.
 Id. Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 59.
 It should be noted that Alexei Borovoy was closely familiar with the political systems in Western Europe where he wrote his thesis. His invectives against “the rule of the people” criticized bourgeois outlook in general. Borovoy inherited this attitude from Herzen, who also influenced him in a way. (See: RYABOV, P. V., Alexei Borovoy and Alexander Herzen. Pryamukhino Readings 2012, Moscow, 2013.)
 BOROVOY, A. A., Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917, p. 27.
 Thus, given the cost of successful election campaigns, the principle of income qualification is actually preserved.
 See: BOROVOY, A. A., Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917.
 Ibid. p. 28.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 140.
 Id. The history of personal freedom in France: Response to reviewers Mosk. University Professor Tarasov and Prof. Elistratova. Мoscow, 1911, p. 10.
 Quoted from: UDARTSEV, S. F., Political and Legal Theory of Anarchism in Russia: History and the Present State. A doctorate thesis for a degree in law. Moscow, 1992, p. 468. (Id. The written and unwritten laws. In: Rassvet, 1925, 10 Mar, p. 2).
 Borovoy maintained long communication with Reisner while staying in Germany during his academic trip, and with Yashchenko they were close friends from their student days.
 It’s worth noting that Borovoy continued the original encyclopedic tradition of Russian anarchists who used to have interests and influence that went far beyond the political and legal philosophy. Prince Kropotkin was internationally acclaimed as an anarchist theorist, but also as a geographer and an expert in natural sciences; Count Tolstoi won recognition as the classic of both Russian and world literature; Bakunin was one of the leading revolutionary practitioners and was involved in the Paris and Praga uprisings of 1848 and the Dresden uprising of 1849. Similarly, Borovoy’s talents could not be fit into the confines of any single field — his activities and interests were broadly diverse.
 BOROVOY, A. A., The history of personal freedom in France: Response to reviewers Mosk. University Professor Tarasov and Prof. Elistratova. Мoscow, 1911, p. 12.
 Ehrlich, E., Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, 2003, p. 39.
 Ibid. p. 493
 BOROVOY, A. A., Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 146.
 Id. Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 95.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 146.
 Ibid. p. 129.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 140.
 Id. Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 104.
 Id. Anarchism. Moscow, 2011, p. 146.
 Here he criticizes the position of the Lev Petrazhitckii`.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Individual and Society in the Anarchist Worldview. Moscow, 1920, p. 95.
 On the other hand, even major theorists who specialize in issues of fair social order cannot avoid criticism for the lack of convincing arguments regarding the limits of freedom of contract. Mainly for this reason, contract theories have lost popularity in the 20th century. The most influential attempt to restore this tradition was the “Theory of Justice” by John Rawls, who proposed the concept of a hypothetical contract where the parties, in order to be in equal negotiating positions, are placed behind a “veil of ignorance”. However, according to Dworkin, “a hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all.” DWORKIN, R. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, 1977. P. 151. See, for example: RAWLS, J. A., Theory of Justice. Cambridge, 1999.
 BOROVOY, A. A., Social Ideals of the Modern Humanity. Liberalism. Socialism. Anarchism. Moscow, 1906, pp.65–66.
 Ibid. p. 66.
 Ibid. p. 74.
 RGALI. Fund 1023. Inventory 1. Unit 167. “How I Became an Anarchist”. Sheet 12.
 Borovoy sees the way towards the eradication of the evils of parliamentarism in “the new forms of lawmaking”, such as “a constituent convent” and “direct vote”, (BOROVOY, A.A., Revolutionary Creativity and Parliament (Revolutionary Syndicalism). Moscow, 1917, p. 28.), as well as in consolidated syndicalism born though the transformation of working class self-organization forms typical of the capitalist system. (BYSTROV, A. S., Political and legal views of Borovoy A. A. (anarcho-humanism). In: Pravovedenie. St. Petersburg, 2016, p. 203.).
 ROUSSEAU, J.-J., Émile, or On Education, Book II, [translation by Allan Bloom], 1979, p. 93.